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Indicators of Cyclical Recessions
and Revivals in Canada
W. A. Beckett
Application of the National Bureau Method to Canadian Data
THIS paper presents preliminary results of a study designed to test, in
a Canadian setting, some of the techniques of business cycle measurement
and analysis developed by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
An attempt has been made to duplicate and analyze, for Canada
during the postwar period, the National Bureau's twenty-one highly
conforming indicators of recessions and revivals, together with their
related diffusion indexes. In pursuing this objective, NBER concepts and
techniques have been followed as closely as possible, although with the
resources available it was not possible to make a comprehensive analysis
of Canadian data along the lines pursued by the National Bureau. We
have worked primarily with twenty of the twenty-one highly conforming
indicators. These may not necessarily be the processes with the highest
conformity to Canadian business cycles. Rather, our limited objective
was to discover how these particular series behaved in another country
and for a different time period.(The National Bureau selection
of indicators was made on the basis of prewar data for the United
States.)
The concept of the reference cycle has been employed, and turning
points in Canadian business have been tentatively selected on the basis
of general economic analysis supplemented by scrutiny of a wider selection
of time series (e.g. national accounts data, trade statistics, etc.) than are
embraced in this report.
The twenty series used here have all been seasonally adjusted, except
for new orders and the bank rate on day-to-day loans, using the new
Census Method 11.1 Specific cycles have been marked off in these
individual series according to standard practice,2 except that as a guide
the Spencer fifteen-month weighted moving average generated by the
NOTE: This study was prepared while the author was a member of the staff of the
Department of Trade and Commerce, Ottawa, Canada.
1julius Shiskin and Harry Eisenpress, Seasonal Adjustments by Electronic Computer
Methods, Technical Paper 12, New York, NBER, 1958. See also Shiskin, Electronic Com-
puters and Business Indicators, reprinted here, Chapter 17.
2Burnsand Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles, pp. 5ff.
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seasonal adjustment program has been used in place of shorter averages.3
Average leads and lags have been calculated by comparing specific with
reference cycles.
Finally, five general diffusion indexes based on the twenty indicators
were calculated. In selecting various moving averages for this purpose,
the ratios of irregular to cyclical movements (see note 3) were used instead
of the average duration of run as in the appendix to Moore's Occasional
Paper 31 (reprinted here, Chapter 20). The relationship between average
duration of run and !/ for American series was examined, as well as the
i/C ratios for both the Canadian and American data.4
Thus, it can be seen that the analysis in this report carries only part
of the way. The major conclusions are restricted to the twenty statistical
indicators. Work is going forward on additional indicators and diffusion
indexes of selected aggregates such as production, employment, profit
margins, and so on. Measures such as cycle relatives, patterns, and
indexes of conformity have not been calculated for the Canadian data.
Finally, the period under consideration is restricted to the postwar period,
when only two mild contractions were evident in the two countries.
However, limited examination of prewar data confirms the general
conclusions reached here.
Despite these limitations,the results thus far have been highly
encouraging. The factual data below seem to support the following
general conclusions.
1. In the postwar period, aggregate economic activity in Canada
displays a type of fluctuation conforming to the definition of business
cycles; recurrent cycles of expansion and contraction are observable
in many economic activities within the aggregate.5
2. Reference cycles occur in Canada at about the same time as they
do in the United States, but the amplitude of cycles, both in aggregates
and in many specific series, is much smaller in Canada. Seasonal ampli-
tudes, on the other hand, are relatively larger in Canada.
3. Among the twenty time series selected, there seems to be a reason-
able degree of conformity to the business cycle.
4. In general, the same activities that lead reference cycle turning
points in the United States also lead in Canada and by about the same
See the papers cited in note 1 for more detail on the nature of Spencer curves,
related measures of irregular movements, and months for cyclical dominance (MCD).
Method II permits the decomposition of time series into trend-cycle (C), seasonal CS),
and irregular movements (I). Average measures of these, as well as the ratios of one to
another, are printed out. These are extremely useful additions to the tool kit of time series
analysis.
'See Table 10.5.
'Some question can be raised as to whether 1948—49 should be identified as a business
cycle contraction. See comment below in connection with the discussion of the movement








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7SELECTION AND INTERPRETATION OF INDICATORS
margin; the same general correspondence applies to roughly coincident
and lagging indicators.
5. Diffusion indexes based on Canadian statistical indicators trace
out a time path very similar to those for the United States; these indexes
lead the reference cycle turning points.
6. Finally, the indicators and diffusion indexes have proved extremely
helpful in current economic analysis and in short-term forecasting.
Now this rather general correspondence in the behavior of the indi-
cators and diffusion indexes in Canada and the United States may not be
surprising in view of the many similarities between the two countries.
Both are "nations that organize their work mainly in business enterprises."
They are closely tied together by social and cultural as well as economic
bonds; common ownership or control in many fields is supplemented by
a common economic intelligence in others. Trading relations are of course
extremely important, with each being the other's best customer.
But if there are similarities, there are also differences. Canada is a
much smaller country, and it is growing more rapidly. Canada's depend-
ence on foreign trade is much greater. In the United States, agriculture
is relatively less important, manufacturing relatively more important.
Resource development has been more pronounced in Canada in the
period under review. There are differences in market size, in plant size,
and hence in economies of scale (and even these differ among industries
and over time). Differences exist in the structure and operation of
financial institutions and in the role of government.
The list of similarities and differences is a long one. Some of these are
revealed in Table 10.1 and Chart 10.1, which show the behavior, for a
recent period, of gross national product and its components, together with
industrial production and unemployment. The statistical material on the
twenty indicators throws further light on the impact of the above-
mentioned factors on cyclical timing and amplitude. There is a strong
suggestion that some traditional views on the international transmission
of cycles are in need of revision.
To illustrate: it has been contended that Canadian business cycles
originate abroad, in Canada's major trading areas, and are transmitted
here with a time lag (usually set at about six months). The data below
show that, for the postwar period, business cycle turning points in Canada
and the United States coincide almost perfectly (Table 10.2). Scattered
evidence for the interwar period does not support the time lag theory.
This suggests that domestic forces (which have a counterpart abroad),
such as inventory and fixed capital investment, are at work as well as
external forces.
Again, it has been argued that United States business cycles are
transmitted abroad, to her major suppliers, with an increased amplitude.




Gross National Product, Industrial Production, and Unemployment,
United States and Canada, 1952—55
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TABLE 10.2
Postwar Business Cycle Turning Points,













This, itis contended, is due to the traditionafly greater volatility in
United States inventories and imports than in domestic activity; and the
cycle is further aggravated in Canada through the operation of the export
multiplier.6
The findings here (Chart 10.1) show the contrary, i.e. that cyclical
amplitudes in Canada have been considerably less than those in the
United States during the two recent adjustments; evidence from the
prewar period, again, is in line with this experience.7 An important factor
operating to dampen cyclical amplitudes has been the greater volatility
in Canadian imports than in domestic activity and a consequent relative
stability in inventories. Moreover, Canada reveals the strong growth
trend of a younger country with rapidly developing basic resource
industries.
The Behavior of Statistical Indicators
To provide a detailed examination of the statistical material, Table 10.3
lists the twenty-one indicators and Table 10.4 summarizes the timing
characteristics of these indicators in Canada and the United States. In
addition, to assist understanding, the sources and nature of the data are
shown. Two sets of average lead and lag intervals are given for the American
series: one covers the interwar period, the other the postwar period. The
timing of the Canadian (postwar) data at each turn is recorded in
Table 10.4.
The Canadian data are also plotted on Charts 10.2, 10.3, and 10.4.
Here, according to NBER practice, shaded areas represent periods of
general business contraction, and unshaded areas, periods of expansion.
The dots identify specific cycle peaks and troughs in individual series.
6SeeE. Marcus, Canada and the International Business Cycle, New York, 1954. Also a
paper by the same author, "Inventory Fluctuations and U.S. Imports," presented at the
American Statistical Association annual meeting, December 1955. Another view is that
of V. W. Malach, International Cycles and Canada's Balance of Payments, Toronto, 1945.
For data and interpretation on the prewar period, see 0. Rosenbiuth, "Changes in
Canadian Sensitivity to United States Business Fluctuations," and E. J. Chambers,
"Canadian Business Cycles since 1919: A Progress Report," papers presented at the




Twenty-one Indicators of Revivals and Recessions, Canada and United States
United States Canada
A.Leading Indicators (with sources)
1. Business failures, liabilities,
industrial and commercial, inverted
(Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,
seasonally adjusted)
2. Industrial common stock price index
(Dow-Jones & Co. Inc.)
3. New orders, durable goods, value
(Department of Commerce,
seasonally adjusted)
4. Residential building contracts
(F. W. Dodge Corporation,
seasonally adjusted)
5. Commercial and industrial
building contract awards
(F. W. Dodge Corporation,
seasonally adjusted)
6. Average hours worked per week,
manufacturing
(BLS, seasonally adjusted)
7. New Incorporations, number
(Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,
seasonally adjusted)
8. Wholesale price index,
28 basic commodities
(BLS)

















1. Commercial failures, liabilities,
inverted
(D.B.S.—Commercial Failures,
assignments made under the
Bankruptcy and Winding Up
Acts, seasonally adjusted)
2. Industrial common stock price index
(D.B.S. Prices and Price Index)
3. New orders, durable goods
(D.B.S., not seasonally adjusted)
4. Contract awards, residential,
in 1949 dollar values
(McLean Building Reports,
seasonallyadjusted)
5. Contract awards, commercial and
industrial, in 1949 dollar values
(McLean Building Reports,
seasonally adjusted)
6. Average hours worked per week,
manufacturing
(D.B.S. Manhours and Hourly
Earnings, seasonally adjusted)
7. not available
8. Wholesale price index,
industrial materials
(D.B.S. Prices and Price Indexes,
seasonally adjusted)
9. Index of employment, industrial
composite
(D.B.S. Employment and Payrolls,
seasonally adjusted)
10. Persons without jobs and seeking
work, inverted
(D.B.S. The Labor Force,
seasonally adjusted)
11. Corporate profits after taxes,
quarterly
(D.B.S. Corporate Profits, quarterly,
seasonally adjusted)
12. Checks cashed in clearing centers,
excluding Montreal and Toronto









14. Index of industrial production
(FRB, seasonally adjusted)
15. Gross national product, quarterly
(Department of Commerce,
seasonally adjusted, at annual
rates)
16. Wholesale price index, excluding
farm products and foods
(BLS)
C.Lagging Indicators (with sources)
17. Personal income
(Department of Commerce,
seasonally adjusted, at annual
rates)
18. Sales by retail stores, value
(Department of Commerce,
seasonally adjusted)
19. Consumer instalment debt
(FRB, seasonally adjusted)




book value in current prices
(Department of Commerce,
seasonally adjusted)
14. Index of industrial production
(D.B.S., seasonally adjusted)





16. Wholesale price index, excluding
animal and vegetable products
(D.B.S. Prices and Price Indexes,
seasonally adjusted)
17. Personal income excluding farm
income, quarterly
(D.B.S. National Accounts,
seasonally adjusted, at annual rates)
18. Retail sales, value
(D.B.S. Retail Trade,
seasonally adjusted)
19. Consumer instalment debt, quarterly
(Bank of Canada,
seasonally adjusted)
20. Interest rate on day-to-day loans
(Bank of Canada)
21. Manufacturers' inventories,
book value in current prices
(D.B.S., Inventories and Shipments,
seasonally adjusted)
NOTE:BLS =Bureauof Labor Statistics
D.B.S. =DominionBureau of Statistics
FRBFederal Reserve Board
Chart 10.5 depicts five simple diffusion indexes based on various combi-
nations of the indicators, and Chart 10.6 shows the same indexes in
cumulated form.
An examination of these data suggest, in a general way, that the same
processes that traditionally lead the business cycle in the United States
also lead the Canadian business cycle, and by about the same margin.
Again, those processes which turn in rough coincidence with general
business activity in the United States behave similarly in Canada. The
same holds true generally for the lagging indicators. These findings can
be discerned in the measures provided in Table 10.4, as discussed below.
The variation between average leads and lags for Canada for the
postwar period and for the United States for the (longer) prewar period
is in the same direction and affects the same processes as a comparison
of prewar and postwar United States data. Table 10.4 itself reveals the
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TABLE 10.4
Lead or Lag of Twenty-one Indicators of Cyclical Revivals and Recessions,
and Five Diffusion Indexes, Canada and United Statcs
LEAD(—) ORLAG (+)INMONTHS
Prewar Average, At Postwar Business Cycle
at Business Cycle PeakTroughPeakTrough




United States—10.1(14) —7.5(15)N/C —6 —28 —6
Canada n.a. n.a. N/C N/C N/C —4
2. Industrial stock
prices
United States—5.9(16)—6.3(16)—30 —4 —6 —11
Canada na. n.a. —4 —4 —21 —8
3. New orders
United States—6.7(3)—2.5(4) —5 —3 —6 —9




United States—8.7(6)—4.5(6) —30 —9N/C N/C




United States—5.2(5)—1.7(6) —32 —2N/C N/C
Canada n.a. n.a. N/C N/C N/C N/C
6. Average work-
week, mfg.
United States—3.8(4)—2.8(5)N/C —4 —7 —4
Canada n.a. n.a. N/C N/C —1 C
7. New
incorporations
United States—2.5(17)—3.5(19)—30 —6 N/C N/C




United States—2.2(11)—1.5(12)—10 —4 —29N/C
Canada n.a. n.a. —2 —2 —27 +2
B. Coincident Series
9. Employment
United States—0.2(12)—2.7(12) C C —1 —l
Canada n.a. n.a. C +4 —2 +3
10. Unemployment
(inverted)
United States+2.0(1)+1.0(2) —6 C +1 C
Canada n.a. n.a. —19 +6 —4 +2
11. Corporate profits
United States—1.5(4)—1.8(5) —6 +1 —2 —9
Canada n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. —5 —7
12. Bank debits
United States+2.3(14)—4.1(16) —3 —2 N/C N/C
Canada n.a. n.a. N/C N/C —6 +3
13. Carloadings
United States+3.4(14)—3.6(14)—21 C —31 C






















































































United States —5.2(5)—7.4(5) —6 —4 —3 —10
Canada n.a. n.a. —5 +2 —5 —7
Lagging series
United States n.a. n.a. —3 C —2 C
Canada n.a. na. +4 —4 +1 —1
Combined series
United States n.a. n.a. —15 —10 —6 —10










a Numberof business cycle turns covered is given
N/C =nocycle or no corresponding turn
C =coincident












































Ratio scales used throughout except for curve 6.
Shaded areas represent business contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.
Dots identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles.
301Ratio scales used throughout.
Shaded areas represent business contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.










































Five Lagging Series, Canada, 1947—57
Ratio scales used throughout.
Shaded areas represent business contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.


















close timing of specific cycle peaks and troughs for the same processes for
the two countries. Particularly noticeable are the movements in prices
and in the coincident series generally. The long lead in prices, a departure
from prewar average experience, for both countries in the postwar period
is a reflection of the Korean War and its aftermath.
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CHART10.5



































15 leading and roughly coincident





Computed from directions of change in centered moving averages applied to each
seasonally adjusted indicator; the number of rising indicators is taken as a percentage of
the total number in the group.
Shaded areas represent business contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.
Dots identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles.
noted.First, it was necessary to make some modifications in the Canadian
data. Commercial failures include what are termed personal bank-
ruptcies (originating in the province of Quebec) and these tend to inflate
the series and aggravate its irregular component. A test run, excluding
Quebec, revealed somewhat better conformity, but this adjustment was




Cumulated Diffusion Indexes, Canada, 1947—55
Shaded areas represent business contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.
Dots identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles.
TheCanadian series on new orders for durable goods was not avail-
able for a sufficiently long period to permit an appropriate seasonal
adjustment, and it was thus not feasible to mark off specific cycles. (In
calculating the diffusion indexes new orders were smoothed with a centered
twelve-month moving average.)
For the two contract award series, floor space figures were not avail-
able; in their place, deflated dollar values of contracts awarded have been
used. The irregular component in both these series (see Table 10.5)
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is considerably greater than for their United States counterparts. Part
of the reason for this may be that large individual awards constitute a
greater proportion of the total in Canada than in the United States.
A number of the indicators have behaved in very systematic fashion.
These include average weekly hours in manufacturing, employment,
checks cashed (bank debits), industrial production, and retail sales. For
most of these series, the basic data in the two countries are highly com-
parable and the cyclical timing conforms well.
Unemployment, although a coincident indicator, has displayed a
slight tendency to lead at the peaks and lag at the troughs in Canada.
Freight carloadings have shown the same tendency. Both series are
characterized by a level or downward secular trend over the period studied
(i.e. when unemployment is taken invertedly). In the case of unemploy-
ment, a stable long-term rateimpliesa secularly rising number of un-
employed. The trend in freight carloadings is related no doubt to com-
peting forms of transport—air, trucking, pipelines—which have grown
apace in Canada during the postwar period. In either case, the data
suggest that cyclical weaknesses will show up earlier and last longer in
processes where the long-term trend is not upward, at variance with most
other measures of the economy.
In Canada, corporate profits revealed a clear lead for the one cycle
for which the data are available. Corporate profits in the United States
behaved similarly in the 1953—54 recession. This is a series that might be
expected to lead, on a priori grounds, though analysis of United States
data for the interwar period leaves the issue in doubt.8 Further work on
aggregate profits, profit margins, profits diffusion, and on industry detail
might be revealing and useful.
No specific cycles were marked off for gross national product or
personal income (both exclude the farm sector). As can be seen from the
charts, neither showed more than a slight retardation during the two
postwar adjustments. Indeed, their behavior underlines the mildness of
Canada's postwar recessions. The impact of both cycles fell most heavily
on the commodity-producing industries. The declines there were offset
within these two aggregates by continued growth in the services. Built-in
stabilizers, coupled with rising tendencies in most factor prices, have also
had their impact on personal incomes.9
The levels of both consumer instalment debt outstanding and manu-
facturers' inventories have displayed clear lags like their American counter-
parts. In place of the bank rate on business loans, we have used for Canada
8SeeT. Hultgren, Cyclical Diversities in the Fortunes of Industrial Corporations, and G. H.
Moore, The Diffusion of Business Cycles (reprinted here, Chapters 11 and 8)See also
Chapters 3 and 12.
°Cf.Daniel Creamer, Personal Income During Business Cycles, Princeton for NBER, 19.56.
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1. Business failures (inverted) n.a.




5. Commercial and indus-
trial building contractsn.a.
6. Average workweek, mfg.0.7
7. New incorporations















21. Inventories (end of
month)
PART ONE
21.53.716.65.8 1.3 4.5 7
1.71.5 1.31.1 1.3 0.9 2
12b
n.a.16.92.821.86.00.8 7.7 7
19.73.213.26.2 1.5 4.2 7
0.60.1 1.84.50.3 13.1 4
0.5 0.30.4 1.20.70.2 2.9 2
4.8 3.52.9 14.11.20.3 4.9 3
4.4 4.30.9 7.14.70.6 7.8 6
n.a. 3.60.7 5.15.10.7 7.3 6
0.9 0.60.6 2.11.00.3 3.4 2
0.8 0.30.7 1.60.40.2 2.2 3
n.a. 1.90.7 7.12.90.310.7 4
3.3 2.52.7 3.30.90.8 1.2 3









I 8, 16, 20,21
2 2,9,14













the interest rate on day-to-day loans which became available only recently.
This series lagged behind the 1954 trough by eight months.
Let us pause briefly here and summarize the behavior of the Canadian
indicators in terms of the criteria of a good cyclical indicator set forth
by the National Bureau. Other things being equal, a series was considered
more useful as an early indicator of revivals :10
'° See Mitchell and Burns, Chapter 6.
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TABLE 10.5
Average Monthly Amplitudes of Seasonal, Cyclical, and
Irregular Components of Selected Indicators,





CI I C S I/CI/SS/C(months)
1.3 0.6 1.1 0.40.6 1.6 0.4 1
0.7 0.30.6 0.20.5 1.3 0.4 1
SELECTION OF MOVINGAVERAGES
Casda United States
Moving Average AverageDuration MovingAverage













PeriodsRun in CI 7 I C S I/C I/S S/C(months)(months)
16.0 15.1 3.1 9.8 4.9 1.5 3.2 6 1.6
1.9 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.4 0.8 4 2.4
5.2 4.6 2.0 5.9 2.3 0.8 3.0 6 1.9
8.2 7.7 2.6 11.1 3.0 0.7 4.3 6 1.7
13.3 12.8 2.8 10.3 4.5 1.2 3.6 6 1.6
0.4 0.3 0.2 0.5 1.7 0.6 3.0 4 2.6
4.4 4.2 1.2 8.7 3.5 0.5 7.3 6 1.5
2.1 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 3 2.8
0.4 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.2 2.8 2 3.6
5.2 3.8 2.8 9.3 1.4 0.4 3.3 5 2.6
3.2 3.0 0.8 6.1 4.0 0.5 8.0 6 1.4
3.2 2.9 1.1 5.1 2.7 0.6 4.6 5 1.8
1.1 0.7 0.7 2.3 1.0 0.3 3.2 2 3.6
0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.6 2 8.3
0.8 0.5 0.6 4.4 0.9 0.1 7.8 2 2.7
1.9 1.7 0.6 6.7 3.0 0.2 11.9 4 1.7
1.7 0.3 1.6 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.4 1 13.8
0.9 0.2 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.4 1 11.3
b New orders series not seasonally adjusted, smoothed with centered 12-month average.
NOTE:Forfuller titles of the U.S. and Canadian series, see Table 10.3. The analysis has not been applied
to series 3 (new orders, Canada), 11 (profIts), 15 (GNP), or 20 (interest rates). Data for series 7 (new incor-
porations) are not available for Canada.
1.The longer its average lead at past revivals.
2. The more uniform are these leads in occurrence and length.
3. The closer its specific cycles come to having a one-to-one correspond-
ence with business cycles.
4. The more clearly defined its specific cycles.
5. The less intenseitserratic movements in comparison with the
amplitude of its specific cycles.
6. The fewer the changes in the direction of its month-to-month move-
ments.
7. The smaller and more regular the seasonal variations that have
to be "eliminated" before the specific cycles can be studied.
8. The larger the number of past revivals covered by the series.
9. The farther back in time any irregularities in conformity to business
cycles revivals occurred.
10. The broader the range of activities represented by the series.
11. The more stable the economic significance of the process represented.
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Although phrased in terms of revivals and leading series, the criteria can
readily be applied to recessions and to coincident or lagging series.
Because of the short period (1947—55) covered in the data here, it
has been impossible to test for criteria (1), (8), or (9). No attempt has
been made to construct a measure on which to assess criterion (3).
About thirteen of the Canadian indicators have clearly defined specific
cycles in the postwar period. About half reveal reasonably uniform timing
—of course, for one or two cycles only. (Again, limited examination of
interwar data supports this conclusion.) Six series have irregular move-
ments that are large relative to cyclical amplitudes (larger indeed than the
corresponding United States indicators).'1 By and large, most Canadian
series have a larger seasonal variation than the comparable American
data. These latter two factors are not such big disadvantages now that
reasonably good quality measures of seasonality and irregularity are
available on an electronic computer program. Most of the series are
broadly representative(criterion10)and significant(criterion11).
On balance, only about half of the indicators in Canada are free
from one or more major shortcomings (although experience with a
longer period for some of the indicators would doubtless improve this
rating).
In view of these rather severe limitations and the other considerations
mentioned above, it is significant that when the indicators are aggregated
into the diffusion indexes shown in Charts 10.5 and 10.6, the results are
strikingly similar to those obtained for the United States.
First, a word on the construction of these indexes. The cyclical signifi-
cance of given month-to-month (or quarter-to-quarter) changes will vary
among individual seasonally adjusted series depending on the extent
of irregular movements. Before determining the number of series under-
going expansion or contraction, it is useful to smooth these irregularities
from the data with moving averages of varying length in order to achieve
reasonable comparability. There are a number of alternative measures
which might be employed as a guide in selecting these moving averages.
Moore has used a concept termed the average duration of run. In
constructing this measure, a record is made of both the direction of a
change in a given month and the number of months the series has been
moving in that direction. That is, a rise in one month following a decline
is counted as + 1, a continued rise in the second month +2, and so forth
with arbitrary limits of 6. (Declines are counted as —1, —2, and so on.)
The behavior of a given series over a long period can be summarized
in the average duration of run. The higher this average, the smoother
the series and the more significant are month-to-month movements.
In this paper, a somewhat analogous measure has been used, the ratio
'SeeTable 10.5.
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of irregular to cyclical amplitude (l/ ratio), developed by Shiskin as
part of Method II. This measure is inversely related to the average
duration of run; the lower the 1/ ratio, the smoother the series. These
various measures for both Canadian and American series are shown in
Table 10.5. In summary, at the bottom of the table is the scheme on which
the moving averages were selected.
In general, 1/C ratios are somewhat larger in Canada because of a
relatively large irregular and in some cases because of a small cyclical
component. Some series, commercial failures and the two on contract
awards, have been smoothed with longer (seven-month) moving averages.
Other modifications from Moore's averages include a one-month average
for the wholesale price and the interest rates series (the former seems to be
smoother than the United States index and the latter is a quarterly series
in the U.S.), and quarterly smoothing for personal income and consumer
instalment debt (these are available monthly for the United States but
only quarterly for Canada). These and other differences can be seen
most readily in Table 10.5. This table also reveals that series with a large
cyclical amplitude in the United States have the same characteristic in
Canada—e.g. unemployment, business failures.
A rise in the moving average for a given series is designated as a plus,
a decline as a minus, and no change is credited half to the plus count and
half to the minus. The number of pluses (included halves) expressed as
a percentage of the total number of indicators provides the percentage
expanding. The cumulated net percentage expanding is calculated by
cumulating from month to month the net difference between the per-
centage expanding and the percentage contracting. As long as more series
are rising than falling, the cumulated curve will rise; it begins to decline
when the number falling exceeds the number rising, and so on. Both the
simple and the cumulated diffusion indexes have been calculated for the
leading series, for the roughly coincident indicators, for the laggers, for
the three groups in combination, and finally for the leaders and coincident
series with the former shifted forward in time four months; this latter
adjustment is based on the observed average lead of the leading series
over the coincident series for the United States.
There are a number of points worth noting about the behavior of
these several diffusion indexes. First, in general, they trace out a path that
is strikingly similar to the National Bureau's indexes for the United
States. The index of leading series is slightly more erratic in Canada.
This may be because the Canadian index is based on seven, instead of
eight, series and because the relatively high I/C ratio in some of the
Canadian leaders may be only partly ofiet by the longer moving averages
employed. Despite these limitations, the index of leaders reveals a specific
cycle (and some subcycles that have not been fully examined yet) which
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clearly turns ahead of the swings in general business activity. The long
lead on the 1954 trough is particularly noteworthy.
In general, the diffusion index based on leading series has turned
ahead of the four other diffusion indexes. The leading series turned
earliest at the 1948 peak, at the 1949 trough, and at the 1954 trough.
However, the leading series index turned in the same month as the com-
bined series at the 1953 peak, and led the coincident series and the fifteen
leading and coincident series by only one month. (These individual leads,
based on the simple diffusion indexes, are shown in Table 10.4). During
the subcycle that occurred in 1951—52, the leading series led at the peak
but lagged behind the other series at the trough. On balance, this gives
the leading series about a 60 or 70 per cent success record.
Again, the diffusion index based on the coincident series has an 80
per cent success record, following the movement in the leading series in
five out of six cases. However, at all of the major turning points except
1949, the roughly coincident index reached a peak or trough before the
reference cycle turning dates.
The behavior of the lagging series index has been even more regular:
it lagged behind the leading series at all major turning points and behind
the coincident series in every case but one. The diffusion index for lagging
series has tended to turn at about the same time as the general turns in
business, with a short lead at the general turn at the 1949 trough and
again at the 1954 trough. This strength in the lagging indicators at
business cycle troughs again underlines the very mild nature of Canada's
postwar adjustments.
Thus, our simple measure of the scope of expansion and contraction
reveals the path of the "unseen cycle" which leads the turns of general
business activity. But we must know more about it. How does one use
these indexes? How does one distinguish between a "false start," such as
late 1947, and a real decline, such as 1953? How does one interpret the
differences between early 1951 and 1953? Is the diffusion index for the
leading series very helpful when it spends as much time below 50 per
cent as it does above? To answer these questions is to demonstrate the use
of these measures, but this must be accompanied by a clear statement of
their many limitations.
The Use of Indicators and Diffusion Indexes for Forecasting
One point is clear: the indexes did, at least, correctly herald the two
recessions and revivals experienced in the postwar period. They further
revealed a change in the nature of the expansion that occurred in 195 1—52.
Let us illustrate the use of the indicators and diffusion indexes for short-
term forecasting by the 1953—55 period. In the text that follows the times
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specified do not allow for the reporting lags inherent in the raw data,
which are sometimes quite long.
In January 1953, six months before the peak in general business
activity was reached, the diffusion index based on twenty indicators had
reached a peak of 87 per cent expanding. This became a peak only because
of the subsequent decline and, as we shall see, it was not possible to
identify it until a few more months had passed. As Charts 10.5 and 10.6
show, there was little to concern the analyst at this time. All of the co-
incident and lagging indicators were rising and only two of the leading
series—industrial and commercial contracts and wholesale prices of
industrial materials—were falling. Five out of seven expanding leaders
indicated a reasonably healthy situation, although not as strong as in
some prior periods, such as early 1950.
In February, three additional series reversed their direction—stock
prices, carloadings, and general wholesale prices. In March, commercial
failures, average hours worked in manufacturing, corporate profits, and
checks cashed joined the declining group of series. By April there was
clear evidence of a peak having been reached in the coincident series
index, the combined index, and in the leaders and coincident series
combined. In May, only nine out of nineteen series were expanding, in
June—ten, and in July—eight. Thus, between January and July, in the
short space of six months, nine sensitive indicators had experienced a
sustained reversal of direction. The forces of expansion had given way to
the forces of contraction.
This picture is much more sharply drawn than one that might have
been obtained from studying rates of change in some major aggregates.
Thus, between January and July, employment fluctuated within a range
of 1 per cent; unemployment (seasonally adjusted) rose by only 5,000
on a base of 130,000; industrial production was down by less than a point
from its April peak. (A diffusion index, based on the components of
industrial production, however, had reached a peak back in December
1952 and had crossed the 50 per cent line in April.) Gross national product
actually rose by $250 million between the first and second quarters.
Nothing in these figures would have given one cause for concern. How-
ever, the sharp movements that occurred in four of the five diffusion
indexes correctly foreshadowed the events to come. Specific cycle peaks
occurred in employment in May, unemployment in March, industrial
production in April, and the gross national product in the third quarter.
Here we see how useful was Mitchell's proposition on the cumulative
nature of the business cycle. The diffusion indexes point up dramatically
how the processes of contraction begin while expansion is still dominant
and how the contraction spreads or diffuses until it becomes the pre-
dominant force. The diffusion of activity among the components of the
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major economic aggregates is at its maximum sometime before the peak
in these aggregates and it is in the vicinity of a general business peak that
the diffusion indexes move most rapidly.
Again, the diffusion indexes can throw some light on the probable
duration of the decline as well as on its possible magnitude. Three months
after the peak, only 25 per cent of the indicators were rising. Three of the
four laggers were still rising. There was some evidence of recovery among
the leading indicators, evidence which became much clearer six months
after the peak or midway in the decline. The picture presented here
suggested strongly that the decline would be more than a pause for
breath, but that it would be limited in both duration and magni-
tude.
By March 1954, three months before the end of the general recession,
all of the diffusion indexes except the lagging series had passed their
troughs. Expansion was under way while contraction was still dominant.
The percentage of rising indicators rose from 37 in March to 57 in April,
49 in May, and 57 in June when once more the balance had swung to
expansion. It is worth noting parenthetically that a year-to-year com-
parison of most of the major aggregates would have suggested continued
deterioration. Employment, profits, and industrial production were
still below .their levels of the previous year and unemployment sub-
stantially above it, although most had passed their individual troughs on
a seasonally adjusted basis.
The behavior of the diffusion indexes through late 1954 and most of
1955, in comparis'on with earlier periods, threw much light on the vigor
of the expansion which was under way. For most of 1955, nearly 90
per cent of the indicators were registering increases—a sustained level
that had not previously been reached in the period shown here, except
for a few months in 1950. As events have proven, the 1955 boom was
stronger than either 1953 or 1950—51.
A number of important questions remain, some practical and some
theoretical. First, the discerning reader may accept our description of the
1953—55 period, but he will certainly want to know how to distinguish a
false start from the real phenomenon. In particular, he will want to
know why we have shaded in a recession in 1948—49 but not in 1951.
The answers to these pertinent questions will help us demonstrate the
limitations of the indicator and diffusion approach.
First of all, we shall turn to late 1947 and early 1948. The combined
diffusion index had fallen from 87 per cent expanding in September 1947
irregularly to 50 per cent in March 1948. Did this not suggest a cyclical
peak in the offing? On the basis of the indexes alone, one could say no.
The drop did not carry as far as 50 per cent, except for a single month.
The forces of expansion remained dominant although its scope was
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reduced. The diffusion indexes correctly mirrored movements in employ-
ment and production, both of which dipped very slightly in early 1948.
But neither the magnitude nor the duration of these drops was sufficient
to warrant using the word "recession." The reader will note that con-
firmation of movements in the indexes has been sought in the movements in
selected indicators and in a wider framework of analysis. This points up
one of the limitations of the indexes per Se: they cannot be used in iso-
lation; they are an aid to analysis but not a substitute for it.
By May 1948, the diffusion index of the coincident series had re-
bounded to 100 per cent and the index based on the twenty combined
series had returned to 81.3 per cent. At this point, the leading series
index indicated continued weakness and in September 1948 it crossed
th 50 per cent line. The roughly coincident series followed this develop-
ment and by October 1948 had fallen to 57 per cent. Subsequently,
weakness developed in the lagging series and the combined index fell
below 50 per cent in January of 1949 and, except for a single month,
remained there until June 1949.
There is some question as to whether 1948—49 should be counted as
a reference cycle according to National Bureau concepts. The absence
of data for five series, and in particular for manufacturers' inventories
and new orders for durable goods, makes the problem difficult. Limited
weakness was evident in total employment and industrial production
(see Charts 10.2—10.5). Unemployment rose steeply through 1949 to its
early winter peak in 1950. Stock prices fell from mid-1948 to mid-1949
as did both wholesale price series. With the exception of unemployment,
these movements were not exceptionally large. While the diffusion indexes
did cross the 50 per cent line, they did not fall far below it nor did they
remain there for very many months.
It should be pointed out, however, that there were certain special
factors operating to insulate Canada from cyclical movements in the
North American economy as a whole. Direct import controls in the
period 1948—50 had limited the extent to which inventories could be built
up. Thus, the extent to which stocks got out of line with final sales in
Canada was much smaller than in the United States during the same
period. However, the weakness abroad did react unfavorably on particular
industries—logging is an outstanding example—and new investment was
slowed somewhat, particularly in industries related to primary resource
development. However, commodity production in secondary manu-
facturing industries was in a relatively favorable position with a protected
home market characterized by strong consumer demand, and little
weakness was evident here. Adding up all these factors, it is clear that
a cyclical movement distinguishedmost of 1949 from other periods before
and after.
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Special factors, however, also distinguish 1948—49 from the later
recession in 1953—54. The limitations of the diffusion indexes as such
become even clearer when we examine the 1951 period. Here the indexes
display a movement that is as sharp and almost as protracted as in
1948—49. And yet we do not regard this as a recession because the reference
cycle should be determined from a wider framework. Following are some
of the factors involved in this assessment of broader considerations. Gross
national product dipped for only a single quarter and then resumed a
rapid increase. Unemployment, which had more than doubled in the
1948—50 period, rose by 39 per cent. The declines in production and
employment were modest and of limited duration. Finally, a general
analysis of this period revealed that there were two dominating factors:
prices and inventories. Prices fell rather steeply following the excesses
immediately after the Korean period. The substantial build-up in
inventories, which had been made possible by the removal of the direct
controls that had limited the growth of inventories before 1948—49,
ceased. Both the inventory and price movements occurred at a time when
all other aspects of final demand were strong. The correction in 1951
thus amounted to a type of rolling readjustment and did not cumulate as
in 1953—54, nor react as unfavorably on either investment or unemploy-
ment as in 1948—49. All this suggests again that we must examine not just
the indexes, but also their component indicators, and that a rounded
interpretation must use other data and other techniques.
In 1953—54, on the other hand, the indexes moved more sharply and
fell to lower levels. By November 1953, the index of combined series had
fallen close to its lowest level of the period covered. Employment and
production had fallen more steeply than in any previous period and
unemployment had risen more steeply. These events had been preceded
by downward movements in the indexes as early as six months before
the peak. To round out the interpretation of this period, it was necessary
to understand that the inventory adjustment would take place at a
time when weakness was evident in some aspects of final demand, notably
investment, government purchases, and exports.
Thus, we conclude that the diffusion and indicator approach to
current analysis is a valuable supplement, particularly in the early stages
of identifying cyclical movements, but it is only a supplement. It is not an
easy, inexpensive short cut to understanding, but rather a valuable
addition to a kit containing many other tools.
A Tentative Theoretical Explanation of Timing Indicators
The reader will appreciate that until now most of the argument has
been based on the results of empirical study and reasoning from historical
analogue. But there must be a logic or theory inherent in the consistent
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behavior of these indicators. The sequential relations among the indicators
have been firmly established by the empirical evidence developed by the
NBER. Moreover, confirmation of these relations appears to be reasonably
well documented for Canada for the postwar period.
But what of the causal connections between processes? If it is important
and helpful for the analyst to know that certain indicators consistently
lead the business cycle and that others lag just as consistently, it is equally
if not more important to know why.
A complete explanation, of course, would presuppose not only a larger
sample of indicators, but would constitute in effect a rounded theory of
the business cycle. Indeed, the formulation of such a theory has long been
the object of Mitchell and his successors at the National Bureau (not
to mention the researchers in many other schools of thought). Such an
ambitious project cannot be encompassed in this short paper. However, it
may be useful to offer some very tentative suggestions that may serve as
a guide to a fuller theory.
Let us first try to trace the relations among the fluctuations in these
"many economic activities." There are two major questions about the
leading processes: Why do they lead? Why do they rise and fall? To the
second question, we shall return later. In reply to the first, we may discern
three groups within the leading indicators.
One group contains leading indicators that reflect businessmen's
expectations about the profitability of business. These processes are
organically related to the second group of investment decisions below.
In this first group, we would place commercial failures, industrial stock
prices,corporate profits(possibly), and profit margins(certainly).
Current, and hence prospective, profits have implications for business
deaths and births. These, in turn, are reflected in later cycles in production
and employment. Sustained movements may impair or bolster business
confidence and lead to changes in investment decisions which again lead
movements in production and employment.
A second group contains leading series that represent major business
decisions about future production. Here we find new business incor-
porations, contracts awarded for industrial and commercial buildings
and for housing, and new orders for durable goods. The fact that these
series are leaders appeals to common sense. A period of time must lapse
between the awarding of a contract or the placement of an order for
equipment and the actual production of the goods in question. There
may be developmental work—the preparation of plans and designs.
Administrative detail must be arranged, labor hired, and materials
assembled. The actual value of production may rise from a small beginning
to a peak rate and then taper off as the contract or order is completed.
Thus it may be several months before a decision to invest is fully reflected
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in actual production. As awards rise and fall in cyclical succession, future
production must reflect these changes to a greater or lesser degree. The
extent of the lead may vary and respond to changes in structure over time,
but the lead will remain as one useful guide to slcort-term trends.
A third group contains advance indicators of conditions in the labor
market. Businessmen may wish to observe emergent trends for some
time before making costly adjustments in staff size. Varying of hours of
work permits an interim assessment before a change in the number of
persons on the payroll becomes necessary. Thus, changes in hours of
work typically precede those in employment, or in unemployment.
Finally, the patterns in profits, investment, inventories, and new orders
tend to show up very early in sensitive commodity prices. Here market
forces are important and immediate determinants of prices, in contrast to
the situation for prices in which there is an element of administrative lag,
such as interest rates or wage rates.
In short, the leading indicators are, by and large, measures of processes
or decisions which are logically taken before goods are actually produced
or labor utilized. Thus, cycles in production and employment are reflected
earlier in cycles among the leading indicators. The question still remains,
what causes the leaders to turn up and down, and to this we shall return
presently.
In the coincident group of indicators are found those broad measures
of economic activity which almost by definition constitute the business
cycle: employment and unemployment, total output and transactions,
commodity production including the transportation of goods, and the
general price level. In varying combinations, these processes are used as
measures of over-all business activity and must necessarily turn coincident-
ally with it. Further, they reflect, with a lag, pronounced cyclical move-
ments in the leading indicators.
The lagging series are of two types. The most important group contains
those that represent costs to business—personal income (largely labor
income) and its associated expenditure and interest rates. (Others laggers
of a similar nature include wage rates, hourly earnings, and labor costs
per unit of output.) These series continue to rise after production and
employment turn down. Wages are insensitive downward, particularly
in response to small changes in demand, because of the organized structure
of the labor market. The price of money remains high after the peak of
the cycle partly because of administered rigidities in the money market
and partly because the demand for money to finance inventories lags.
The second group contains lagging indicators that are measures of
stocks—of goods in inventories and of consumer credit outstanding
(including also currency in circulation and money holdings). Other
researchers have shown the relation between the flow aspect of a process
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and the stock aspect of the same process." If the flow measure of an
indicator turns coincidentally, then the stock measure will tend to lag.
For example, new consumer debt incurred is a roughly coincident indi-
cator, but this is consistent with the fact that the amount outstanding will
continue to rise, but at a slower rate, after new debt incurred begins to
turn down. In addition, the lag in consumer debt may in part be related
to the corresponding income lag. Similarly, the work of Abramovitz
suggested that inventory investment is a coincident series and this implies
that the stocks of goods held will lag behind. In the case of inventories,
time is required to adjust production to sales. For example, a slower
increase in sales leads to an actual accumulation of inventories—other
things being equal. Many goods are sold on long-term contracts or
originate in distant foreign sources. Adjustments here take time.
To put the final block in place, a word must be said about the causal
relations between laggers and leaders. Here the cumulative and con-
tinuous nature of the business cycle is revealed. It has been noted that
shortly after the lagging series turn up, the leaders turn down and vice
versa. Rising costs and slower increases in volume lead to shaved profit
margins. The financing of burdensome stocks creates additional problems.
Expectations dim, commercial failures rise, and stock prices and new
incorporations fall. The attempt to reduce inventories is soon reflected
in drops in new orders and sensitive commodity prices: Hiring slows
down, layoffs rise, and hours decrease as overtime is eliminated and some
short-time instituted. If confidence becomes sufficiently impaired, major
business decisions to invest may drop.
Subsequently, the declines in leading indicators become reflected in
coincident series: in production, employment and prices. These, along
with rising unemployment, help to relieve (cost) pressures, and the sub-
sequent reduction in inventories brings them more into line with current
sales. Both of these factors lead to improvement in profit ratios. The mere
cessation of inventory liquidation means that new orders will rise and
commodity prices will become firmer. These, in turn, lead to longer
hours and increased hiring. A firmer tone supports stock prices; failures
begin to drop; more new businesses are formed and investment decisions
begin to strengthen. Thus, shortly after the laggers turn down, the stage
is set for the leaders to turn up and the cycle is in an expansion phase
again.
The above discussion is, of course, both telescopic and tentative.
It is offered as the type of explanation that can be formulated to "explain"
the cumulative arid Continuous nature of business cycles. It might be
added that, incomplete as it is, there is nothing in such a description that
would be inconsistent with an economic theory of induced investment,
'-'SeeM. Abramovitz, Inventories and Business Cycles, New York, NBER, 1950.
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nor is there a wide gulf between the twenty-one indicators and many of
the variables in current econometric models.
In summary, we have attempted to depict the behavior of the twenty-
one highly conforming indicators and their diffusion indexes for Canada
for the postwar period. In general, and despite limitations in time and
method, we feel that the test has been a useful one. We conclude from
these statistical data that the experience of the NBER indicators has been
confirmed for another country and another time and that indicators are
useful for assessing emergent recessions and revivals. We have attempted
to show, with reference to the 1953—54 period, how the indicators and
diffusion indexes can be used for current analysis and short-term fore-
casting. We have tried to bring out some of the similarities and differences
in Canadian and American behavior which should suggest further research.
Finally, we have implied that the whole approach rests on more than
just an empirical base.
Encouraged by these tentative results, we regard further work in this
field as important and useful. Extending the analysis to an earlier period
to cover more cycles, scrutiny of a wider sample of indicators, further
statistical processing of the data along NBER lines (i.e. the calculation of
indexes of conformity and cyclical patterns), Construction of diffusion
indexes for selected aggregates, and a search for a more detailed
explanation—all these would add materia]ly to the usefulness of the study
and to a fuller understanding of cyclical processes in Canada, as well
as of the international transmission of cycles.
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Cyclical Behavior of Types of Leading Indicators